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Conclusion: Four recommendations to improve digital electoral oversight in the UK 
Professor Helen Margetts, University of Oxford, pa.margetts@oii.ox.ac.uk1  
and  
Dr Katharine Dommett, University of Sheffield, k.dommett@sheffield.ac.uk2 
 
Abstract: To conclude this special section, this article looks at the possible avenues for regulatory reform in the field 
of digital campaigning. Diagnosing the need for a multi-layered approach, we argue that action is needed from 
government, regulators, companies and civil society. Taking each actor in turn, we consider the kind of change needed, 
the prospects for reform, and outline four recommendations for change.  
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Electoral regulation emerges from these four papers as an area requiring urgent treatment. Data-
driven campaigning, oversight of third-party activities, rewriting of expenditure regulations and 
electoral observation, the spread of nefarious content, targeted political advertising and the role of 
social media have all been exposed as issues requiring attention. They also require new 
technological and methodological capacity on the behalf of government and all bodies with 
responsibility for the scrutiny of electoral processes, particularly regulators. We conclude this 
special section by distilling out the proposals made in each paper and putting forward four concrete 
recommendations for action on the behalf of government, regulators, companies and civil society. 
 
The need for alterations in the way we oversee and regulate elections comes largely from the rapidly 
changing use of digital technology over the last ten years, in which electoral politics has shifted 
online. Campaigning inside and outside election periods has moved on to digital platforms, 
bringing several major changes to the institutional landscape of electoral politics. The lines between 
traditional party politics and third parties have become blurred, requiring a shift in the whole way 
that we consider electoral organisations (as Rowbottom has discussed). Similarly, the period of 
electoral campaigning activity has expanded, indicating a need to regulate continual campaigning 
activity (not just a brief window leading up to polling day). Election periods are strangulated by 
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surges in harmful, hateful and misleading content, as Neudert has described, while the widespread 
availability of almost costless campaigning and vastly cheaper advertising channels has rendered 
expenditure limits derisory. Meanwhile technological tools such as machine learning have made 
the mechanics of campaigning ever more opaque, offering mounting challenges to the scrutiny of 
procedures (as Wagner has discussed).  
 
Over time, electoral regulation and laws have been introduced in incremental piecemeal fashion, 
creating what the Law Commission recently described as a ‘complex, voluminous and fragmented’ 
landscape. i As policy makers contemplate a reaction to the injection of technology into elections 
there is a risk that they may further complicate systems of oversight. Whilst recognising this danger, 
the papers in this special section have shown an urgent need for change. Issues of transparency 
underpin much of what are wrong with electoral design and regulation, as Power has made clear, 
and are a major challenge for public awareness, as discussed by Neudert. Digital phenomena 
therefore need to be recognised in systems of regulation, but as these papers indicate, there are 
many different actions that the government and regulators could take to improve oversight of 
online election campaigns.  
 
In this conclusion, we argue that there is an urgent case for the regulation of digital campaigning. 
Yet, far from diagnosing a simple solution, we argue that, in focusing on different institutions, the 
four papers within this special section illustrate the importance of a multi-layered approach to the 
oversight of elections. No one body, or law can achieve substantive change alone, and while the 
actions of one or another digital platform may be highly significant – Facebook, for example, owns 
both WhatsApp and Instagram, so decisions made there are particularly important – change in one 
company alone will never be enough. Nefarious content will simply move between platforms, and 
campaign practices will evolve and shift. Pressures for change must apply across companies, and 
involve multiple institutional actors, including citizens themselves.  
 
1. Action from Government 
 
During the period in which political campaigning and political parties have been transformed 
through widespread use of social media, the accumulation of electoral law has been piecemeal, 
incremental and incredibly slow. As noted in the Introduction, even where action has been 
pledged, as in the government’s commitment to implementing digital imprints as requested by the 
Electoral Commission, and the plans for Ofcom to acquire new powers to act as the online harms 
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regulator, little tangible change has been enacted. The ‘need to continually update the processes 
for oversight and sanction that exist to uphold core democratic ideals’ noted in the Introduction 
(Dommett) has not been fulfilled. Consequently, changing modes of campaigning and the legal 
framework are diverging, rendering necessary a comprehensive rewriting of electoral law regarding 
campaigning, political parties, third parties, periods between elections and expenditure limits. 
Without such change, there is a risk that confidence in the electoral process will start to be eroded, 
having significant implications for electoral participation and perceived legitimacy.  
 
We propose a wholesale rewriting of electoral law. As outlined by Rowbottom, there is a need to 
clarify and simplify existing regulation so that campaigners do not have to navigate complex tiers 
of regulation. There is also, as both Rowbottom and Power suggest, a need to think further about 
transparency, to ensure that additional insight is offered into campaign spending and activity by a 
range of different organisations. We therefore agree with the Law Commission that there is a need 
to rationalise the current laws governing elections into a single, consistent legislative framework 
governing all electionsii And yet we argue that further attention needs to be paid to how to compel 
and oversee digital campaigning activity. Whilst proposals for a digital imprint are to be welcomed, 
further data gathering and reporting is required for online electoral oversight.  
 
In making this point, we recognise the longstanding calls from the Electoral Commission for an 
increased remit and power to oversee digital activity. The Electoral Commission was created with 
weak powers, and their capacities have been fundamentally challenged by the rise of digital 
technology. As a result, the Electoral Commission needs more powers, more along the lines of the 
Information Commissioners’ Office (ICO). These should include the power to gather more insight 
on digital activity and spending through financial declarations and invoices, to issue larger fines 
for breaches of electoral law, and to compel information disclosure from platform companies. 
Calls for these powers have been repeatedly outlined and endorsed, indicating widespread support 
for these forms of change.iii   
 
In adding our voice to calls for electoral law to be updated we recognise that this is the most 
unlikely of our recommendations to be actioned. Electoral regulation is rarely top of an incoming 
government’s ‘to do’ list, especially when the government has been embroiled in various tussles 
over the role of activities on Facebook during the referendum campaign. So even as the UK 
government starts to emerge from the current global public health and economic crisis of 2020, 
electoral law is unlikely to be a priority. One hope is that in the new landscape, where so much of 
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everyone’s social, economic and political activity has moved online during lock-down, is that 
central government will recognise the urgent need for new regulatory capacity that incorporates 
technological understanding. Given the weight of the current crisis situation that sits on the 
shoulders of the ICO (particularly with regard to contact tracing) it seems a good moment to start 
to distribute powers and capabilities more evenly across existing regulatory bodies. 
 
Recommendation 1: wholesale rewriting of Electoral Law, with an increase in powers to 
the Electoral Commission, along the lines of the ICO. 
 
2. Action from regulators 
 
In addition to action from Government, regulators themselves can also take action to respond to 
the challenges posed by digital technology. As outlined by Chris Gorst at the workshop preceding 
this special issue, regulators can endeavour to practice anticipatory regulation that aims to be 
‘flexible, collaborative and innovative’. iv This raises the question, what could regulators do to 
change their own activities and processes to be better equipped to respond to digital technologies? 
Whether thinking about the Electoral Commission, ICO, Ofcom, Advertising Standards Agency 
(ASA), Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), Equality and Human Rights Commission 
(EHRC) or the many other regulatory bodies found within government, it’s clear that all regulators 
face similar challenges, as the markets and societal activities that they regulate are being 
transformed by digital platforms and the ubiquitous use of data-intensive tools and technologies. 
All regulators therefore need, as Neudert suggests, to upskill themselves, collaborate, engage in 
long-term thinking and horizon scanning and put pressure on the government to make necessary 
legislative change.  
 
At present, we have little understanding of where regulators lack appropriate expertise and capacity 
to respond to digital technologies and where examples of best practice lie. There are, however 
signs that regulators face challenges in attracting and retaining expertise and staff who possess 
pertinent digital expertise. There is accordingly a need, as the House of Lords Select Committee 
on Democracy and Digital Technologies has recently suggested, to conduct a review of regulatory 
digital capacity across the CMA, ICO, Electoral Commission, ASA and Ofcom to determine levels 
of digital expertise and where internal investment may be needed.v 
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There are some signs that regulatory bodies can develop informal practices that help to promote 
an anticipatory approach by sharing expertise and collaborating to resolve common challenges. 
The ICO has led the way in pioneering this approach, in the creation of the ‘AI in regulation’ 
working group, where they bring regulators together to discuss issues in common, such as data 
sharing and linking, and the protection of vulnerable groups. This group is attended by key 
regulators including the ASA, the CMA and Ofcom (although not the Electoral Commission), 
providing a forum for sharing expertise around artificial intelligence.  This model provides a 
possible template for similar anticipatory practices in relation to digital election campaigns, 
recognising that responsibilities cross institutional boundaries and that pertinent expertise lies in 
different regulatory bodies. The idea of a committee of regulators who share best practice and 
conduct horizon scanning activity therefore provides an important means of pooling resources 
and expertise to tackle key issues of electoral regulation.  
 
The need for greater collaboration is not only beneficial for sharing capacities and skills, it also 
provides an important mechanism for tackling sensitive and challenging topics. The issues that 
surround digital campaigning are often controversial, with trends such as misinformation, fact 
checking and data misuse challenging to regulate. This trend has already been observed, with a 
2019 BBC News Item reflecting that when presented with the issue of political advertising ‘….the 
regulators made various sounds that bore a striking resemblance to what you heard the last time 
you were juggling a hot potato….The Electoral Commission said its focus is campaign finance; 
the Information Commissioner's Office (ICO) said its focus is personal data; The Advertising 
Standards Authority (ASA) said it doesn't do political ads.’vi By creating committees of regulators, 
(or ‘regulatory liaison committees’) with shared oversight for such issues, not only would resource 
and skills be shared, but political exposure would be minimised, allowing regulators to act on 
presently challenging issues. This approach has been advocated by the House of Lords Select 
Committee on Democracy and Digital Technologies who have recommended the creation of a 
regulatory committee composed of the ASA, the Electoral Commission, Ofcom and the UK 
Statistics Authority who ‘should co-operate’ to collectively enforce a code of conduct on political 
advertising.vii Recognising existing examples and these recommendations, we propose: 
 
Recommendation 2: The creation of a regulation liaison committee, that brings together 
the key regulators involved in electoral regulation – the ICO, OFCOM, the ASA, and the 
Electoral Commission - to address key issues of electoral regulation and oversight. 
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3. Action from companies 
 
The actors with the most capacity to influence immediate change are the digital platforms 
themselves, especially Facebook. The design, content moderation policies and internal policing of 
their platforms shape electoral politics in every country where they operate. Indeed, in non-English 
speaking countries with weak states unlikely to intervene, their influence proceeds more or less 
unchecked. Although much criticised for tackling issues too little and too late, many platforms 
have taken some kind of measures to tackle various problems relating to electoral politics. For 
example, Facebook has started producing a transparency report, has opened up advertising 
libraries, set up partnerships with factchecking organisations, worked with and to some extent 
opened up to university researchers and developed a ‘trusted information’ indicator for news items. 
Twitter has now embarked on a campaign to flag misleading information and incitement to 
violence, even applying these labels to some of President Trump’s more outrageous claims on their 
platform.  
 
Initiatives from Facebook and Twitter are examples of companies setting the agenda both in terms 
of what is made transparent, but also around what counts as ‘political’ – so companies can provide 
information and set the terms of acceptable practice. Indeed, Facebook recently published what it 
called a ‘white paper’ on content moderation on the regulation of online harm,viii opening it up for 
public consultation. The key issue here is that companies are playing the dominant role in policing 
what is and isn’t allowed, including for elections. Furthermore, while doing so they are guided by 
a US perspective and international, not national policies and norms.  
 
We recommend that the welcome, but modest, initiatives towards transparency of the platforms 
themselves should be expanded and regularised, moving ‘from transparency to accountability’, 
following some of the recommendations of Glasnost! nine ways Facebook can make itself a better forum 
for free speech and democracy,ix an independent report that was produced by a joint Stanford-Oxford 
team after discussion with Facebook and other platforms. Both Power in this volume and others 
elsewhere have pointed to the potential limitations of transparency,x but if used carefully it can be 
a principle that will ‘deliver greater confidence in the electoral process’.  If it is to be so used, as 
Power suggests, then it must apply not only to political advertising, but also to the curation and 
delivery of news feed, and the processes of content moderation. In addition to these transparency 
measures it is, however, necessary to advance mechanisms for accountability by creating national 
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oversight bodies for electoral processes, involving regulators, researchers and civil society 
organisations nominated by national governments.  
 
Will companies do this? Given that political advertising represents a relatively small proportion of 
their revenue model, especially when set against the huge reputational damage that their role in 
politics has brought to them, to Facebook especially, there might well be scope for such a change. 
Platforms have shown more willingness in recent years to address public concerns around activities 
on their platforms. There have been moves to work more with academic researchers, civil society 
groups (particularly with respect to hate speech, for example) and government organisations, such 
as the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (DCMS), the parent regulator for Ofcom 
and the ICO. And yet, as discussed further in the next section, much of this change has been a 
response to public pressure. As commercial companies that are driven by financial rather than 
democratic imperatives, there are reasons to be sceptical that platforms will fundamentally alter 
their activities. However, the changes made to political advertising transparency in response to 
pressure from policy makers (such as the US Honest Ads Act)and civil society (such as the 
principles outlined by Mozilla) indicate that these bodies may react to external pressures. 
 
Recommendation 3: platforms should expand and regularise their efforts towards 
transparency and develop systems for accountability and oversight. These systems should 
be overseen by national advisory groups composed of regulators, academics and civil 
society representatives who advise, investigate and report on company practices.  
 
4. Action from civil society. 
 
Legal, regulatory and platform change will not alone achieve lasting protection of the electoral 
environment. Now that political processes rely so heavily on digital technology, understanding 
how they are shaped by such technology - including related phenomena such as online hate and 
targeted advertising  –- is a crucial element of citizenship education. Public understanding is 
important both for raising awareness, but also for mobilising political pressure for change (as 
discussed above). Whilst recent public opinion research conducted by DotEveryone has shown 
growing public understanding of how technology works, they also found people’s understanding 
to be shallow, and to contain many gaps.xi This indicates the need for new efforts to improve 
public understanding of digital technology, specifically around its uses in election campaigns. 
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Civil society organisations are already conducting important work in this area. Who Targets Me 
have created browser extensions that allow people to monitor the ads that are being targeted at 
them on Facebook, and have made the case for greater platform transparency. Full Fact have 
performed a fact checking role, working closely with Facebook to flag misinformation online. The 
Open Rights Group have campaigned on privacy and free speech online, focusing on data use at 
elections. Groups such as Tell Mama have also highlighted Islamophobia and drawn attention to 
hate speech and abuse online. These organisations collect and distribute vital insights into online 
electoral (and non-electoral) activity, raising public awareness of digital practices and concerns, 
and creating political pressure by lobbying for change from government and companies. 
 
Public understanding and political pressure can also be exerted through public service journalism. 
The stories run by  Pro Publica and Channel 4 News, for example,  during the aftermath of the 
Cambridge Analytica scandal, resulted in Facebook thanking publicly (on Twitter!) journalists for 
raising issues and forcing them to improve their act.xii Other coverage of online election advertising 
by the BBC, Buzzfeed and First draft, similarly raised public awareness of misleading third party 
campaign groups at the recent general election. 
 
Pressure can also be mobilised by the public themselves. Campaigns to ‘delete Facebook’ and to 
boycott certain social media platforms can create pressure that leads to change. And yet, such 
actions require understanding. Calls for digital literacy campaigns have become a recurring feature 
of recent political debate, with, for example, the DCMS Select Committee, House of Lords 
Communication Committee and Children’s Commissioner calling for digital literacy to be the 
‘fourth pillar’ of education alongside reading, writing and maths. Whilst some changes have been 
made to integrate computer literacy skills into the national curriculum, the breadth of information 
given to children – let alone the insights offered to adults – is minimal. There is accordingly a need 
to devise and roll out mechanisms for increasing citizen knowledge.  
 
One mechanism for increasing public understanding comes in the form of public awareness 
campaigns. As noted in the introduction, the ICO has already conducted a ‘Your Data Matters’ 
public awareness campaign that was seen to successfully increase public understanding of data use. 
Other regulators or actors within the electoral landscape have not, however, conducted similar 
activities to increase public awareness of digital election activity. Recognising this absence, we 
suggest that the ICO, ASA, Ofcom and the Electoral Commission should come together to 
develop a campaign explicitly aimed at improving public understanding of the role digital 
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technology can play in elections. Such an initiative could involve detailed work on transparency 
through explainability, as the ICO have also done (working with the Alan Turing Institute) in 
Project Explain.xiii This recently published report is based on extensive citizen juries and other 
research to understand what the public expect in terms of explainability of processes, services and 
decisions made with machine learning algorithms across sectors, in their use in financial services 
and medical treatments for example. A similar methodology could be used for the specific area of 
elections, identifying the kind of information people feel they need to possess. This could lead to 
projects focusing on the use of algorithms by political parties and other campaigning organizations; 
the mechanics of online political advertising, or the content moderation policies of digital 
platforms companies.   
 
Recommendation 4: A public awareness campaign to enable citizens to understand and 
scrutinise electoral processes and be able to navigate the landscape of political information 
both outside and inside election periods, involving civil society groups and funded by 
regulators. 
 
The actions proposed by these recommendations are not trivial. Asking for a rewriting of electoral 
law, regulatory collaboration, forcing the huge global digital platforms to open up their processes, 
and getting the general public to care about electoral regulation in the immediate aftermath of the 
global pandemic and economic depression are all major tasks. All of them require a technological 
and methodological ‘tooling up’ for government departments and regulatory bodies. New central 
agencies like the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation, and particular departments such as the 
Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport, can play an important role in driving change, 
but it is vital that any reaction to digital technology is not made by government alone. As the 
discussion above has revealed, a  multi-layered approach to the oversight of elections is required 
that sees government, regulators, companies and civil society play a role. Whilst by no means easy 
to engender, pursuing these forms of change is as critical as it is challenging. The issues highlighted 
in these papers cast doubt on Britain’s ability to hold free and fair elections, a definitional 
cornerstone of what it means to be a democracy. Currently, global platforms are setting the agenda 
while public sector agencies watch on helplessly.  We hope that a combination of the relatively (in 
comparison with the importance of the issue) modest and manageable recommendations put 
forward here might go some way to redressing the balance.  
i Law Commission. (2020) Electoral Law: Final Report, London: Law Commission, p.1. 
ii Ibid, p.185. 
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